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Abstract
This paper introduces persistent productivity shocks in a continuous-time
mononopolistic competition model of trade with hetererogenous ﬁrms similar to
Melitz (2003). In our model, the presence of sunk costs and uncertainty have three
main consequences: ﬁrst, ﬁrms export decisions become history-dependent. Sec-
ond, the model generates ﬁrm dynamics and allows for substantial heterogeneity
in export growth conditional on survival. Policy experiments modify the equilib-
rium along both the cross-sectional and time dimensions. Third, both the gen-
erated equilibrium ﬁrm size distribution and sales distribution of exporters into
a foreign market are Pareto in the upper tail. All three consequences have been
supported by empirical evidence. To solve the model we derive the stationary
productivity distributions for exporters and non-exporters in general equilibrium.
We point to the presence of a link between intra-industry ﬁrm heterogeneity and
the degree of persistence in export status. Finally, we perform a numerical ex-
ercise to show how per-period ﬁxed cost and up-front entry costs are diﬀerently
related to persistence in export status for exporters and non-exporters.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years many studies have highlighted the importance of producer hetero-
geneity in international trade. Only the most productive ﬁrms engage in exporting
activities, suggesting substantial hurdles to accessing foreign markets.1 There are
at least two alternative theories of why more productive ﬁrms enter exports markets.
Bernard et al. (2003) propose a model of trade with heterogenous ﬁrms with country-
wide Ricardian diﬀerences, where ﬁrms in more productive countries are better able
to compete and therefore access more foreign markets. This theory does not require
any ﬁxed cost of entry into export markets. Alternatively, Melitz (2003) put forward
a monopolistic competition model of trade with heterogenous ﬁrms where exporters
need to pay an entry cost to access a foreign market. After these theories were laid
out, more detailed ﬁrm level and transaction level datasets have been used to show
new facts: Eaton et al. (2007) report that sales distributions across markets of very
diﬀerent size and extent of French participation behave similarly to a Pareto in the
upper tail and more like a lognormal in the lower tail. Irarrazabal et al. (2008) and
Amador and Opromolla (2008) ﬁnd similar results for Norwegian and Portuguese ex-
porters respectively. Looking at the dynamics of export participation, Eaton et al.
(2008) for Colombia and Amador and Opromolla (2008) for Portugal ﬁnd substantial
heterogeneity in export growth conditional on survival: ﬁrms are very diﬀerent in the
way they perform after entering export market. Moreover, the industry dynamics
literature has shown that ﬁrms size distribution tends to behave as a Pareto in the
upper tail (Axtell (2001), Luttmer (2007)) and many trade models have subsequently
assumed the equilibrium distribution to be Pareto (Chaney (forthcoming), Helman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004)).
This paper provides a new model which is consistent with many of the old and
new trade facts. Our framework is similar to Melitz (2003) but we assume that ﬁrm
productivities evolve following a Brownian motion. This single modiﬁcation generates
1Among many, see for instance Bernard and Jensen (1995) and (1999).
2three main consequences: ﬁrst, unlike in a model without market uncertainty, the way
trade entry costs are modelled aﬀects ﬁrms decisions. When trade entry costs are sunk
upon entry in the export market ﬁrms export decisions are history-dependent while
w h e nt h e ya r ep a i do nap e r - p e r i o db a s i st h e ya r en o t . 2 Second, the model generates
ﬁrm dynamics: ﬁrms are created, grow or shrink in size, start or stop exporting
and possibly shut down. It is possible to analyze how policy changes modify the
equilibrium both along the cross-sectional and the dynamic dimensions. Third, both
the equilibrium ﬁrm size distribution and the sales distribution of exporters into a
foreign market are Pareto in the upper tail and increasing in the lower tail.
In our model, the presence of sunk costs and uncertainty generates new predictions
in terms of the decision to stay or leave the export markets. Entrepreneurs make
investments to set up ﬁrms and draw their initial labor productivity level from a
common distribution. Production for the domestic market starts even if proﬁts are
negative (as long as they are not too negative) and continues until the expected net
present value of current and future proﬁts and the value of the option to exit are high
enough. If ﬁrm productivity exceeds a threshold it becomes proﬁtable to enter foreign
markets by paying a sunk cost. This entry cost has to be paid every time a ﬁrm starts
to export. If, later on, productivity falls below the level at which the ﬁrm had started
exporting the entrepreneur prefers to keep exporting, as long as the net present value
of exporting proﬁts plus the value of the option to stop exporting is bigger than the
value of the option of reentering the export market. In other words, the presence of
uncertainty introduces an option value in the decision to enter or leave the export
markets. Current exporters wait longer to leave the export market in order to avoid
to repay the entry cost later on, even at the expense of periods of negative proﬁts.
Similarly, non-exporters wait for higher productivity levels before entering export
markets. There is a range of productivity (or size) levels within which nonexporters
decide not to enter export markets and exporters decide not to leave them. This is
known in the irreversibility literature (Dixit (1989), Dixit and Pyndick (1994) ) as the
2This point is stressed by Antras (2004).
3band of inaction. We adapt the model of Dixit (1989), which consider the decision
of entry and exit from an industry. In his model ﬁrms need to decide to enter or
leave an industry when prices are stochastic. Our model retains the same qualitative
characteristics of Dixit, but because we consider entry and exit decision from the
export market we need to generalize Dixit’s system of value matching and smooth
pasting conditions to account for the aggregate changes in the demand. Sunk cost of
exporting and uncertainty are present in the work of Tybout and Roberts (1997), who
ﬁnd evidence in favor of history dependence in export participation consistent with
our formulation. More recently, Das et al. (2007) develop and estimate a dynamic
structural model of export supply with plant-level heterogeneity in export proﬁts,
uncertainty and market entry costs. Our model, maintaining the same three main
ingredients, embeds these models into a general equilibrium framework.
Our paper is closely related to Luttmer (2007). We extend his industry dynamics
framework to allow ﬁrms to compete in international markets and we retain the
prediction that ﬁrm size distribution is Pareto in the upper tail. In addition, our
model implies, consistently with recent evidence (Eaton et al. (2007)), that also
the distribution of sales into a foreign destination is Pareto in the upper tail and
increasing in the lower tail. Arkolakis (2008) explains this fact by introducing per
consumer access costs. In our model, instead, there is a measure of exporters that sell
little in the destination market because they do not want to abandon it since they
still hope for a surge in productivity in the future.
Another contribution of this paper is to propose a methodology to solve for the
distribution by types of agents deciding to change status in a continuos time envi-
ronment with uncertainty and adjustment costs. When the underlying uncertainty
follow a standard Brownian motion the distribution of types overlaps along the band
of inaction. Closure of the model requires the solution of a complicated system of
partial diﬀerential equations for the transition probability densities. We use Laplace
transform methods to solve for the distribution of exporters and non-exporters for
the entire range of productivity levels. We then use this distributions to compute the
4aggregate price level of the economy. The method is easy to implement and it does
not rely particularly on the assumptions of our model.
Other papers have analzyed related issues in a discrete time framework: Ghironi
and Melitz (2005) use the Melitz framework as the microeconomic base of a DSGE
model and provide a microfounded, endogenous explanation of the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuleson eﬀect. Alessandria (2007) looks at the comovement of net exports and the
real exchange rate in a equilibrium business cycle model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and
sunk costs of entry into export markets. Costantini and Melitz (2007) and Atkeson
and Burstein (2007) focus on the joint decision of exporting and innovating.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the model,
solves for the stationary productivity distributions by export status and describes the
equilibrium. Section 3 performs a quantitative analysis of the model focusing on
persistence in export status. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Set-up
In this section we introduce the basic ingredients of the model. We deﬁne preferences,
technologies, trade costs and we characterize the value of a ﬁrm and the band of
inaction.
Demand. Time is continuous, starts at t =0and goes on forever. There are
two symmetric countries, each populated by a measure L of inﬁnitely-lived agents.3
Consumers in each country maximize utility derived from the consumption of goods
from one sector. The sector is made of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods. There
is a representative consumer with preferences over sequences of consumption of a
3A version of the model with multiple asymmetric countries is available upon request.






where U(.) is the period utility function. The discount rate ρ is positive and the
representative consumer chooses to consume c(ω) units of each variety ω, for all
varieties in the set Ω (determined in equilibrium), to minimize the cost of acquiring










where σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.
Each consumer is endowed, at every point in time, with one unit of labor which
is supplied inelastically to ﬁrms. The wage rate w is normalized to one and used
as numéraire. The representative consumer faces a standard present-value budget
constraint. Her wealth consists in labor income plus dividends. Each worker owns
a single share of a perfectly diversiﬁed national portfolio of all the ﬁrms and proﬁts
earned by ﬁrms are distributed as dividends in terms of the numéraire.G i v e n t h e
prices set by ﬁrms, the representative consumer chooses how to allocate her budget
across all varieties. Since each variety enters symmetrically in the utility function,







where c(ω) represents the units demanded of variety ω. The consumption-based price
index P,t ob ed e ﬁned later, is the minimum expenditure required to purchase one
unit of the composite good.
Trade barriers and technology. There are three types of trade barriers: a variable
cost τ,ap e rp e r i o dc o s tλX and an up-front cost λH.5 T h ev a r i a b l ec o s tt a k e st h e
form of an "iceberg cost": τ>1 units of the good must be shipped in order for one
4Since we focus on the analysis of the steady state and we do not introduce aggregate growth in
the model, we drop the time subscript whenever possible in order to simplify the notation.
5See Das et al. (2007) for some examples of sunk start-up costs and per-period ﬁxed costs.
6unit of the good to arrive in the other country. The cost λX has to be paid every
period by an exporting ﬁrm. The cost λH has to be paid up-front every time a ﬁrm
starts (or restarts) to export. Both the per period cost and the up-front cost are
expressed in units of the numéraire. These two trade costs play diﬀerent roles in our
model as it will become clear soon.
Both countries have access to the same technology. Goods are produced using
only labor and ﬁrms must sustain a ﬁxed cost of production. Creating a ﬁrm requires
sustaining a sunk cost λE. Afterwards, the ﬁrm draws an initial random unit log labor
productivity ¯ z from a distribution g(z).6 For expositional purposes, we present the
model under the assumption that all new ﬁrms enter with the same productivity level
¯ z. This implies that we assume g(z) to be the Dirac-Delta function δ(z − ¯ z).B e f o r e
turning to the numerical section of the paper we allow g(z) to be any function and
we show how this aﬀects the closure of the model. The cost of producing and selling
c units of the good in the domestic market for a ﬁrm with productivity z is ce−z +λD
while the cost of producing and selling c units of the good in the foreign market is
τce−z + λX. Firms are price setters. The optimal price in the foreign market, set
as a markup on variable cost of production is τe−zσ/(σ − 1) where σ/(σ − 1) is the
Dixit-Stiglitz markup.
Productivity shocks and value of the ﬁrm Following Luttmer (2007), we assume
that ﬁrm labor productivity evolves identically and independently according to a
Brownian motion with drift α and ¯ z as initial condition,
dz = αda + ξdB (2)
where dB is the increment of a Wiener process and ξ>0 is the diﬀusion parameter.
These permanent idiosyncratic shocks can be interpreted as shocks to technology
(producing the same variety at a lower cost), shocks to quality (producing a better
variety at the same cost) or as taste shocks to the demand for the ﬁrm diﬀerentiated
6In the remainder of the paper, for simplicity, we refer to z,a n dn o tt oexp(z),a st h eﬁrm labor
productivity.
7good.
As a result of these shocks, ﬁrms prices, labor demand, revenue, proﬁts, export
participation evolve over time. The value of the ﬁrm is a function both of current
labor productivity z and of its export participation status. For expositional simplicity,
we divide the value of a ﬁrm into a domestic and a foreign component. Like in Melitz
(2003) we assume that the least productive ﬁrms do not export. Moreover, since the
presence of a ﬁxed cost implies a minimum size, ﬁrms with low productivity choose
to exit since they face only a small probability of ever recovering the ﬁxed cost λD
required to continue the ﬁrm. The domestic component of the value of a ﬁrm is
d e s c r i b e db yt h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o n
VD(z)=m a x
n
0,πD(z)+e−(ρ+δ)dtE [VD(z + dz)]
o
where δ is an exogenous, per unit of time, probability of exiting and πD(z) are proﬁts
from sales on the domestic market. Domestic proﬁts are a function of the ﬁrm labor
productivity z and of the endogenously determined price index P,
πD(z)=R(Pez)
σ−1 (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σ − λD
where R = PC is total expenditure. The termination payoﬀ is set to zero. There
exists a single cutoﬀ zD such that for z>z D continuation (of the ﬁrm) is optimal
and for z<z D it is optimal to shut down.7 Notice that in this model there are two
reasons why ﬁrms can exit: because of a negative productivity shock or because of the
killing rate δ. Bigger ﬁrms are less likely to exit because of a negative shock and more
likely to exit because of the killing rate δ. In order to solve the Bellman equation, we
need to apply Ito’s Lemma to ﬁnd the expected continuation value E [VD(z + dz)].I t
turns out that the domestic value of the ﬁrm, in the continuation region z>z D,i s







7F o rt h i st ob et r u ew en e e d :( 1 )π(z)+e
−(ρ+δ)dtE [V (z + dz)] to be increasing in z (2) ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance (which is satisﬁed by the Brownian motion).
8where the right-hand side is the expected total return per unit of time from keeping
the ﬁrm open. In order to solve jointly for VD(z) and the cutoﬀ zD we need the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
VD(zD)=0and V 0
D(zD)=0 . (4)
The domestic value function, valid on the range (zD,∞),
VD(z)=κ2eβ2z +
πD(z)/σ




is the sum of the value of the option to exit (ﬁrst term) and the expected present
discounted value of domestic proﬁts (second and third terms).8 Variable domestic
proﬁts (at the numerator of the second term) evolve as a geometric Brownian motion
with drift α(σ − 1) + ξ2(σ − 1)2/2 and are discounted at the rate r + δ. The present
value of revenues, and therefore of variable proﬁts, is ﬁnite if the combined discount
factor, given by the sum of the interest rate and the exogenous probability of exit δ,
is bigger than the drift of variable proﬁts. The following assumption guarantees that
this is the case and therefore guarantees that the value of a ﬁrm is ﬁnite:
ρ + δ>α (σ − 1) + ξ2(σ − 1)2/2.
Since VD(z) is increasing in z, ﬁrms with higher productivity, with respect to the










is endogenously determined, being a function of the price index P and total expendi-
ture R. The parameter γd is a function of parameters governing the stochastic process
for productivity shocks, time discounting and preferences.9 Economies with a lower
price index P and lower total expenditure R are economies where ﬁrms have to be
more productive in order to survive.
8Formal derivations of all the value functions and cutoﬀs, as well as deﬁnitions of the coeﬃcients










9All non-exporters have a chance of becoming exporters (the likelihood of this
event being increasing in the distance from the lower barrier zD)a n ds o m eﬁrms
do actually export. The presence of a sunk cost of entry and re-entry into export
markets creates a wedge between the productivity level at which ﬁrms decide to start
exporting (zH) and the one at which ﬁrms decide to stop exporting (zL). In the
range of productivity levels between the thresholds zL and zH, the optimal policy
is to continue with the status quo, whether it be exporting or non-exporting. The
interval (zL,z H) is therefore a band of inaction that is endogenously determined in
the model. The value of the ﬁrm has a foreign component which depends on the
ﬁrm productivity z and its current export participation status. As explained by Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) (in a more general context), exporting "is really a composite
asset, part of which is an option to abandon. If that option is exercised, the ﬁrm
(...) acquires another asset, namely the option to invest", that is, start exporting.
We denote with VL(z) the value of the "option to invest" and with VH(z) the value
of being an exporter, including the value of the "option to abandon" export markets.
The two foreign components must be determined simultaneously. They are described
by two Bellman equations,
VL(z)=m a x
n





VL(z),πX(z)+e−(ρ+δ)dtE [VH(z + dz)]
o
(6)
where πX(z) are proﬁts from exporting,
πX(z)=τ1−σR(Pez)
σ−1 (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σ − λX. (7)
Notice that the main diﬀerence between λH and λX is that, under the former, the
decision of stopping to export today aﬀects the payoﬀ from exporting tomorrow. Both
the entry cost λH and uncertainty about future productivity z are necessary for the
presence of a band of inaction. Nonexporters are continuously comparing the value
of becoming exporters VH(z) − λH with the value of choosing the status quo VL(z).
At z = zH, VH(z) − λH = VL(z) and ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between exporting and not
10exporting. Instead, if z is slightly above zH ﬁrms strictly prefers to be exporters.
If, as a consequence of negative shocks, z falls below zH ﬁrms do not stop exporting
(even if current export proﬁts are negative) because the state is diﬀerent and the
payoﬀs to be compared are diﬀerent: the value of stopping to export is still VL(z) but
t h ev a l u eo fc h o o s i n gt h es t a t u sq u oi sVH(z).A tz = zH, for example, ﬁrms are not
indiﬀerent anymore since VH(zH) >V L(zH).W h e n λH is replaced by λX instead,
the value of becoming an exporter, being always VH(z), does not depend on the ﬁrm
current export status. In a model without sunk trade entry costs (i.e. λH =0 )a n d
with a positive per period cost λX the cutoﬀs zL and zH would coincide and have a
closed form solution equal to τ (λX/λD)
1/(σ−1) γ−1
d ezD. Firms would start and stop
exporting at this unique productivity threshold.
Cutoﬀs and band of inaction
The termination payoﬀ of a non-exporter is the value of an exporter with the same
productivity level, VH(z), minus the sunk cost λH. Likewise, the termination payoﬀ
of an exporter is the value of a non-exporter with the same productivity level, VL(z).
The value functions VL(z), VH(z) and the cutoﬀs zL and zH are the solutions of two,
linked, second-order diﬀerential equations subject to the following value-matching and
a smooth-pasting conditions,









The value functions VL(z), valid on the range (zD,z H),a n dg i v e nb y
VL(z)=κleβ1z (9)
is the value of the option to start exporting. It is increasing in z since more
productive ﬁrms gain from entering the export market. The value function VH(z),









is the sum of the value of the option to stop exporting (ﬁrst term) and the expected
present discounted value of export proﬁts (second and third terms).10 More produc-
tive ﬁrms gain higher proﬁts on the foreign markets (higher second term) but the
value of the option to stop exporting is lower because of the small likelihood of this
event (lower ﬁrst term). The lower and higher exports cutoﬀs zL and zH are endoge-
nously determined (depending on the price index P and total expenditure R through
the lower barrier zD) but do not have a straightforward closed form solution. To
summarize, the value of a ﬁrm with current productivity z is VD(z)+VL(z) if the
ﬁrm does not export and VD(z)+VH(z) if the ﬁrms exports.
Free entry and the cutoﬀs We assume that at every point in time there is an
unbounded pool of prospective entrants into the economy. Successful entrants (with
initial productivity ¯ z larger than zD) can be new exporters or new non-exporters.
Assuming the latter, that is zD < ¯ z<z H, in equilibrium the expected value of
entering has to equal the sunk cost of creating a ﬁrm,
λE = VD(¯ z)+VL(¯ z). (11)
The free entry condition and the system (8) determine the three cutoﬀs zD, zL and zH
and the two positive constants κl and κh in the value functions VL(z) and VH(z).U p
to now it was not necessary to disentangle the price index P from total expenditure
R. All the quantities that we have determined were function of P and R through zD.
In order to determine the price index (and to be able to close the model and derive
welfare implications) we need to derive the stationary distributions of productivity,
the measure of active ﬁrms and the measure of exporters.
Due to high non-linearity in the system, it is diﬃcult to obtain an analytical
solution for the thresholds. A partial characterization is possible. First, the thresholds
10Notice that κh i sac o e ﬃcient to be determined in the hysteresis system.
12satisfy 0 <z L <z H < ∞ and the coeﬃcients κl and κh are positive. Second, suppose
that the ﬁrm is not an exporter and that it believes that z will persist unchanged
forever. The ﬁrm will decide to become an exporter if πX(z) ≥ (r+δ)λH. This is the
exporting cutoﬀ when there is no uncertainty and z is constant over time. In our case
instead, πX(zH) > (r+δ)λH > 0 which means that zH, the exporting cutoﬀ, is larger
than the productivity level at which the ﬁrm decides to become an exporter when
there is no uncertainty and z is constant over time.11 When domestic producers take
into account the uncertainty over future proﬁts, they are more reluctant to become
exporters. Similarly, exporters are also more reluctant to abandon foreign markets.
Figure (1) shows some sample paths for ﬁrms’ productivity and export status: in
case 1, a ﬁrm starts as a non-exporter but as productivity increases the ﬁrm becomes,
at age ah, an exporter. Case 2 portraits the evolution of a ﬁrm that exports from the
very beginning but is on a decreasing productivity path and eventually stops exporting
at age al. Finally, in case 3, an initially non-exporting ﬁrm starts exporting when
productivity overtakes zH at age ah but then receives some bad shocks and stop
exporting at age al.
2.2 Stationary Distributions
In this section, we characterize the stationary probability density over productivity
and age and we show how this density can be decomposed into a density for exporters
and a density for nonexporters. The crucial ingredients are the transition densities
generated by the Brownian motion (2) subject to the productivity cutoﬀs zD, zL and
zH.
Stationary probability densities In steady state there is a time-invariant cross-





11This is the case in Melitz (2003).
13Firms attempt to enter at a constant rate MA/M where M is the equilibrium mea-
sure of active ﬁrms and MA is the equilibrium measure of attempting entrants. After
getting their initial productivity ¯ z, they receive a sequence of permanent shocks. The
transition density h(a,z) describes the likelihood that a surviving ﬁrm has produc-
tivity z at age a. This takes into account the possibility that the ﬁrm hit the lower
barrier zD and exit forever but not the exogenous killing rate δ which is controlled
by the term e−δa. Expanding the analysis of Luttmer (2007), we can decompose the
overall distribution f(a,z) into the weighted sum of a distribution for exporters and
a distribution for nonexporters. In steady state there is a constant ratio between
the measure of exporters MX and non-exporters MD.12 Let hX(a,z) describes the
likelihood that a surviving ﬁrm has productivity z and is exporting at age a.L e t
hD(a,z)=h(a,z)−hX(a,z) be the likelihood that a surviving ﬁrm has productivity

















are time-invariant cross-sectional distribution for exporters and non-exporters respec-
tively.
Transition densities and the entry rate The transition densities are the core of the
stationary probability densities f(a,z), fX(a,z) and fD(a,z). The transition density










h(a,z)=0for z ≤ zD,a≥ 0;u(0,z)=δ(z − ¯ z)
(14)
12Recall that M = MX + MD.
13Formal solutions of all the Kolmogorov equations are relegated to the Appendix.
14where δ(.) is the Dirac-Delta function. The above Kolmogorov equation describes a
stationary (over time) probability density function h(a,z). Notice that the density
h(a,z) is a function of the current productivity level z and current age of the ﬁrm a.
We are assuming that this density is the same for diﬀerent cohorts. Let J(a,z) be
the net rate of passage or ﬂux (as a increases inﬁnitesimally) at z (in the z direction)
when age is equal to a so that ∂h(a,z)/∂a = −∂J(a,z)/∂z. When the derivative of
the ﬂux is positive h(a,z) is decreasing in a because, as a increases inﬁnitesimally,
the probability of leaving z is higher than the probability of reaching it.
The transition densities hX(a,z) and hD(a,z) are the solutions of two similar but










H)δ(z − zH) z>z L











L)δ(z − zL) zD <z<z H
hD(a,z)=0 for z ≥ zH ∨ z ≤ zD ,a≥ 0;w(0,z)=δ(z − ¯ z).
where JX(a,z) and JD(a,z) are the ﬂux rates corresponding to the X and D processes.
The two equations have to be solved simultaneously because non-exporters become
exporters at zH and exporters become non-exporters at zL. The derivative of the
transition density with respect to a, when calculated at the relevant export cutoﬀ,
depends on the ﬂux of the other density as well: it takes into account the change of
export participation status when a non-exporter passes zH from below or when an
exporter passes zL from above.14





1 − e−θ∗(¯ z−zD) (16)
is consistent with f(a,z) being a probability density. The higher is the killing rate δ
and the lower is the initial productivity ¯ z,t h eh i g h e ri st h ee x i tr a t ea n dt h e r e f o r et h e
entry rate. The equilibrium ratio between the measure of exporters and the measure
14See the appendix for a discussion of the ﬂux terms and the intuition behind it.
15of active ﬁrms, MX/M, is constant and consistent with fX(a,z) being a probability
density.
Solving a system of partial diﬀerential equations
We use Laplace transform to convert the system of partial diﬀerential equations
(15) with z and a as independent variables into a system of ordinary diﬀerential
equations with only z as independent variable. We ﬁnd the solution of the transformed
system of ordinary diﬀerential equations, ˆ hX(z) and ˆ hD(z) using Green’s functions
and show that ˆ hX(z) and ˆ hD(z) are functions of the Laplace transformed solution
for (14), ˆ h(z) and its derivatives. We derive analytically h(a,z), the inverse Laplace
transform of ˆ h(z), while we use numerical methods to solve for hX(a,z) and hD(a,z),
the inverse Laplace transforms of ˆ hX(z) and ˆ hD(z). In the appendix we show the
details of the solution method. After solving for the transition densities, the cutoﬀs,
the entry rate and the ratio between the measure of exporters and active ﬁrms we
can derive the stationary densities f(a,z), fX(a,z) and fD(a,z).
Stationary productivity densities and volatility The stationary probability densi-
ties f(a,z), fX(a,z) and fD(a,z) describe the equilibrium mass of ﬁrms in terms of
current productivity, age and export status. The marginal probability densities f(z)
and fX(z) are needed to derive the distributions of prices of domestically produced
and imported varieties and therefore to compute the price index P. From (13) we








Like in Luttmer (2007), the marginal density f(z) is increasing in the lower tail and
of the Pareto form in the upper tail,
f(z)=K1e−θ(z−zD) (17)
where K is endogenous but does not depend on z.15 In order to have a stationary
distribution with a ﬁnite mean we need to impose the following assumption,
15The proof is similar to the one provided in Luttmer (2007) and is available upon request.
16δ>α+ ξ2/2.










shows that the density has a thicker right-tail the higher is the volatility coeﬃcient ξ of
the Brownian motion. For high productivity levels, the exporters productivity density
fX(z) inherits the shape of the overall productivity density f(z).A ne x a m p l eo ff(z)
and fX(z) is given in Figure (2). Notice that, fX(z) reaches a peak in correspondence
of zH, the productivity cutoﬀ at which ﬁrms become exporters.16 The productivity
distribution for exporters fX(z) is consistent with evidence (see Eaton et al. (2007),
Irarrazabal et al. (2008) and Amador and Opromolla (2008)) that the distribution of
sales of exporters in the destination market is Pareto in the upper tail and resembles
a lognormal in the lower tail. Arkolakis (2006) explains this fact by introducing an
increasing marginal cost to access additional consumers. In our model, instead, there
is a measure of exporters that sell little in the destination market (and some of them
make negative proﬁts) because they do not want to abandon it since they still hope
for a surge in productivity in the future.
For numerical exercises, it is more convenient to express the size distribution of
ﬁrms in terms of sales or employees. Using the demand equation it turns out that
the sales (r) density is still of the Pareto form in the upper tail but it has a diﬀerent
coeﬃcient that includes the elasticity of substitution σ,
pu(r)=K2r−θ/(σ−1). (18)
Similarly, the upper tail of the distribution of sales within a foreign destination (rx)
is of the form
pv(rx)=K3r−θ/(σ−1)
x . (19)
16This occurs as long as new ﬁrms enter below zH.
17An important characteristic of our model is that the volatility coeﬃcient ξ of
the Brownian motions aﬀects both the shape of the productivity distribution and the
width of the band of inaction (zL,z H).T h e r ei sal i n kb e t w e e nﬁrm level heterogeneity
and the degree of persistence into export status: more heterogeneity in the ﬁrm size
distribution (a higher ξ and therefore a higher θ) is generally associated with a wider
band of inaction.
2.3 Trade equilibrium
We close the model through labor market clearing and the derivation of the price
index P. Before turning to the quantitative section of the paper, we generalize the
model to allow for a generic initial productivity distribution g(z).
Labor market and the price index Labor market equilibrium determines the equi-
librium measure of active ﬁrms M. Labor supply is ﬁxed. Labor is demanded for
creating ﬁrms (LE), sustaining the ﬁxed costs (LF), sustaining the variable produc-
tion costs (LP) and entering into export markets (LH),
LE = λEMA (20)






















The last two equations deserve some explanation. For any ﬁrm, variable costs of
production for domestic sales are a fraction (σ−1)/σ of the domestic revenues of the
ﬁrm while variable costs associated to exports are a fraction (σ − 1)/στ of the cor-
responding revenues. Aggregating, total labor demand for production is a weighted
sum of total expenditure on domestic varieties and total expenditure on imported va-
rieties. The sunk cost of entering into export markets are sustained by non-exporting
incumbents that start exporting because they pass the zH threshold.17 From labor
17Φ0,dt(.) is the distribution function of a Normal with mean zero and standard deviation dt.
18market clearing we derive the equilibrium measure of active ﬁrms M. In turn, this
















The price index is the minimum expenditure required to purchase one unit of the
composite good. As such, it depends on the measure of available varieties in the
economy (M domestic plus MX imported) and on their average price.
The level of total expenditure R is found replacing P in the expression for the lower
threshold zD. The equilibrium level of the composite good C and the equilibrium level
of proﬁts Π are then determined as C = R/P and Π = R − L.
Generalizing the model
In the next section we compute the equilibrium of the model assuming g(¯ z) to
be a Normal density with mean p1 and standard deviation p2. Allowing the initial
productivity density g(¯ z) to be a general function does not complicate substantially
the model presented above but it is obviously worth when comparing the model with
the data. Note that attempts to create new ﬁrms can be unsuccessful, with proba-
bility G(zD), while successful entrants start exporting immediately with probability




[VD(¯ z)+VL(¯ z)]dG(¯ z)+
Z +∞
zH
[VD(¯ z)+VH(¯ z)]dG(¯ z)

















Finally, labor market equilibrium requires to take into account that new ﬁrms that
enter as exporters pay the sunk cost λH as well. This implies an additional term in
the labor demand equation
LH = λH
∙












19The stationary distribution f(z) and fX(z) are still Pareto in the limit. Like in
Luttmer (2007), if g(¯ z) is a distribution with few ﬁrms that are much larger than the
exit barrier zd then f(z) will inherit the exponentially declining tail over most of the
support (zd,∞).
3N u m e r i c a l s i m u l a t i o n s
In this section, we provide a numerical solution to the model to illustrate the behavior
of endogenous variables for which closed-form analytical solutions do not exist. We
choose plausible parameters that are roughly consistent with stylized facts about ﬁrm
size distribution and ﬁrm dynamics for the US economy. To gain some intuition of the
main forces involved in the model we start the analysis by describing how the band of
inaction is determined in general equilibrium. We then use the model to examine the
determinants of persistence of export status: in particular we analyze the impact of
a reduction in trade entry costs under two alternative speciﬁcations of the entry cost
of exporting: in the ﬁrst scenario, we consider an economy where the ﬁxed trade cost
is paid on a per-period basis while in the second scenario we consider an economy
where the entry cost is sunk upon entering the export markets.
Table 1 displays the main parameters used in the simulations. There are large
range of values of the elasticity of substitution used in the literature. We set the
elasticity of substitution σ equal to 2 as in Ruhl (2008). We set the value of the
interest rate to 5% consistent with many calibration exercises for the US economy
(for example, Gibson (2007)). Luttmer (2007) ﬁnds that the ﬁrm size distribution is
well approximated over much of its range by a Pareto distribution with a tail index
around 1.06. This corresponds to θ/(σ−1) in our model. Taking this into account, the
variance of ﬁrm growth, pinned down through the entry rate which for the US is 11.6
percent in 2002, is .45 and the drift parameter α is −0.08. 18 The exogenous death
18See Luttmer (2007) for more details.
20shock is set to 5% as in Constantini and Melitz (2007). We assume the distribution
g(z) of entrants to be normal with mean −.1 and standard deviation 1.6.W es e t
the standard deviation to match the average domestic sales of entrants relative to
incumbents. We choose the variable trade cost to be 1.25.W e f o l l o w A t k e n s o n
and Burstein (2007) and Gibson (2007) in normalizing the ﬁxed cost of setting-up
a ﬁrm to 1, and choose the per period operation cost λD to be .1. Although this
is not a calibration exercise, in Table 2 we compare moments from the model with
actual moments computed using US data. The model delivers reasonable estimates
of the number of ﬁrms engaging in export activities, especially in the second scenario.
It also captures very well the overall degree of ﬁrm size heterogeneity. The model
overpredicts exports as a share of total GDP. The reason is that our model generates
too large ﬁrms as seen in the fraction of employment accounted by exporters.
Figure (3) depicts the stationary distribution of productivity and age by export
status. Panel (a) shows the overall productivity distribution and the distributions of
exporters and non-exporters. First, notice that within the band of inaction (between
zL and zH) the distribution of exporters and non-exporters overlap. Some exporters
are less productive than some non-exporters. This come to grips with plant level facts
(for example Bernard et al. (2003)), an aspect that is missing in the parsimonious
Melitz (2003) model. Eaton et al. (2007), introducing ﬁrm- (and market-) speciﬁc
ﬁxed cost and demand shocks into a static framework, also provide a model that is
consistent with overlapping exporters and nonexporters distributions. In our model,
the overlap is not due to heterogeneous ﬁxed costs but to dynamic factors which
imply that each single ﬁrm start and stop exporting at two diﬀerent z levels. Panel
(b) displays the distributions of age by export status. Exporters need more time to
reach the exporting cutoﬀ and therefore will be on average older.
3.1 Band of inaction
The main mechanism through which changes in parameters aﬀect the response of the
model is through the band of inaction. To gain some intuition we describe how the
21cutoﬀs are determined in the model. We study in some detail the impact of changes in
the sunk cost of exporting λH on the steady state equilibrium values of zD,z L and zH.
In particular, we consider the response of the model to a 20 p e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei nt h e
sunk cost of exporting λH. To analyze how the cutoﬀs are determined we deﬁne the
function S(z)=VH(z)−VL (z) on the interval (zL,z H). Figure 5 shows the change in
S(z) before and after the increase in λH.Panel (a) shows how the lower cutoﬀsr i s e s
and the higher cutoﬀ falls. Notice that the fall in zH is larger than the increase in zL.
Eﬀect on zH
In order to explain changes in zH we must consider a nonexporter facing the choice
of starting to export. The nonexporter compares the sunk cost λH and the lost of an
asset whose value is VL(z) with the beneﬁt of acquiring a diﬀerent asset whose value
is VH(z). We consider how this trade-oﬀ changes for values of z around the old value
of zH:ah i g h e rλH means that becoming an exporter requires a higher investment but
t h ei n c r e a s ei nVH(z)−VL(z) is smaller than ∆λH and, as a consequence, zH increases.
At the old value of zH, a nonexporter prefers to keep selling its good only on the
domestic market. Notice that VH(z) − VL(z) increases both because VH(z) increases
and VL(z) decreases. Since VL(z) represents the option of becoming an exporter in
the future in order to explain changes in VL(z) we must consider what happens to
VH(z) (and viceversa). Since we are looking at values of z close to zH, changes in
VH(z) are explained mainly by changes in the net present value (NPV) component.
Equation (7) shows that proﬁts from exporting are higher since an increase in λH
lowers the barrier zD (a lower zD is in this case equivalent to higher price index P
and/or higher total expenditure R, that is, proﬁts are higher for any surviving ﬁrm).
This is why the change in the NPV component of VH(z), the second and third terms
of (10), is positive. Notice that the eﬀect on the NPV component through changes in
the price index is a general equilibrium eﬀect absent in a partial equilibrium analysis
w h e r et h en e tp r e s e n tv a l u eo fa ne x p o r t e rw o u l dn o tb ea ﬀected by changes in the
sunk cost. The reduction in VL(z), the value of the option to become an exporter,
is due to the fact that even though proﬁts from exporting are higher their expected
22value (from the point of view of a nonexporter) is lower since it is less likely that the
ﬁrm will become an exporter in the future.
Eﬀect on zL
In order to explain changes in zL we must consider an exporter facing the choice of
stopping to export. The exporter compares the lost of an asset whose value is VH(z)
with the beneﬁt of acquiring a diﬀerent asset whose value is VL(z).W ec o n s i d e rh o w
this trade-oﬀ changes for values of z around zL. First we look at changes in VH(z):t h e
change in VH(z) is mainly driven by the change in the option value component (the
NPV component is small to start with since z is low). This is negative since proﬁts
from exporting around zL increase: the option to stop exporting values less when
proﬁts from exporting are higher. This contributes to an increase in zL. Second we
look at changes in VL(z): the change in VL(z) is negative as explained previously. This
contributes to a decrease in zL. Overall the reduction in VL(z) more than compensates
the reduction in VH(z) and therefore zL decreases.
3.2 Persistency of export status
We now use our quantitative model to show how diﬀerent assumptions about the
trade entry costs aﬀect the probability that ﬁrms do not change their export status.
Recently, several papers have considered quantitative dynamic models of trade with
monopolistic competition using annualized cost of access to foreign markets (for ex-
ample Gibson (2007)). Other papers instead (for example Das et al. (2007)) have
estimated models where the cost paid by ﬁrms that want to start exporting is sunk
upon entry. In our exercise, we consider two alternative scenarios. In the ﬁrst sce-
nario, we suppose that ﬁrms need to pay a per period cost to operate in foreign
markets. In the second scenario, we assume instead that the entry cost is paid up-
front every time ﬁrms want to enter or reenter the export markets. A reduction in the
entry cost has diﬀerent implications for the persistence in export status in the two
economies, explained mainly by the diﬀerential response of the cutoﬀs zD, zL and zH.
We measure persistence in export status by considering the elements on the diagonal
23of a one-period transition matrix with three categories: exporters, non-exporters and
exiting ﬁrms. We consider the probability that an exporter in period t keeps exporting
in period t+1(instead of turning into a non-exporter or exiting) and the probability
that a non-exporter in period t keeps non-exporting in period t+1(instead of turning
into an exporter or exiting).
The probability of remaining an exporter is equal to the ratio between the measure

















where Φ0,1(.) is the distribution function of a standard Normal. The probability of
remaining an exporter is equal to the probability of surviving the killing rate (ﬁrst
term outside the brackets) times the probability of receiving a shock that is not too
negative, a shock that would make it unproﬁtable to keep exporting (terms in the
brackets).19
Similarly, we compute the probability of remaining a nonexporter as the ratio be-
tween the measure of nonexporters that remain nonexporters (MDD) and the original





















The probability of remaining an nonexporter is equal to the probability of surviving
the killing rate (ﬁrst term outside the brackets) times the probability of receiving a
shock that is not too negative, in order not to exit, and not too positive, in order not
to be proﬁtable to start exporting (terms in the brackets).20
Scenario I represents an economy with no sunk cost. We set the value of λX to
match the ratio export/output as .3. In Scenario II we set the sunk cost λH to match
19Note that the killing rate is independent from the Brownian motion shocks. Note also that the
requirement that the shock is higher than zL −z both implies that these ﬁrms remain exporters and
do not exit.
20In this case, we require the shock to be between zD − z and zH − z,s ot h a tt h eﬁrm does not
become an exporter and does not exit either.
24the same export/output ratio as in Scenario I. In Figure 6 we compare the eﬀect on
persistency in export status of a reduction in the entry cost under the two scenarios.
First, we reduce λX by half from 1 to .5. Panel (a) plots the probability for an
exporter to keep exporting in the next period and for a non-exporter to keep selling
only on the domestic market in the next period for diﬀerent levels of per period ﬁxed
cost λX. A reduction in λX increases persistence in export status for exporters but
decreases persistence for non-exporters. The intuition for these results is the following.
When the per-period trade cost λX decreases, exporters, conditional on their current
productivity level, enjoy higher proﬁts from their current sales and are more likely
to be able to cover the ﬁxed trade cost in the future as well. On the contrary, non-
exporters are more likely to receive a positive shock to productivity that is big enough
to make it proﬁtable to start exporting. This result, is in line with previous models
of trade with heterogeneity like Melitz (2003) or Chaney (forthcoming). Second, we
reduce the sunk cost λH by half from 5 to 2.5. Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows that
a reduction in the sunk costs of exporting decreases persistence in export status for
both exporters and non-exporters. When the sunk trade cost decreases, uncertainty
about future productivity matters less. An exporter that receives a bad shock is more
likely to stop exporting. The risk of having to repay the sunk cost in the future is
less important because the magnitude of the sunk cost is lower. Similarly, a non-
exporter that receives a positive shock is more likely to start exporting since it is now
easier to cover the additional cost with future export revenues. Recall that in our
numerical exercise for each scenario we calibrate the sunk/per-period costs to match
the same export/output moment. However the implications for the persistence of the
export status are quantitatively and qualitatively diﬀerent. Comparing panels (a)
and (b) we observe that an economy with the sunk cost λH generates substantially
more persistency both for exporters and non-exporters. Therefore, a model with
uncertainty that does not take into account the option value to start and resume
exporting could underestimate the level of persistence in export status.
We have shown that per-period and sunk trade costs aﬀect diﬀerently the persis-
25tence in export status of exporters and non-exporters. Another way to characterize
changes in persistence is to look at the survivor function or at the average time spent
as an exporter or a nonexporter. In panels (c) and (d) of Figure (6) we depict the sur-
vival functions (where the event is a change of export status) for low and high values
of λX and for low and high values of λH. The survival function is computed iterating
the one-period transition probabilities. Comparing survival rates for both scenarios,
we observe that survival rates are larger for both exporters and non/exporters in an
economy with sunk cost. Figure (7) plots the average time spent as an exporter and
as a nonexporters as a function of the magnitude of the sunk cost (in panel (a)) or
the per period cost (in panel (b)).
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we introduce persistence productivity shocks in a continuous-time mo-
nopolistic model of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms. We show that the presence of
sunk cost of entering the export markets and uncertainty give rise to hysteresis in
export markets participation. Firms start exporting once they have achieved a cer-
tain size, but may remain into export markets even after their size has fallen below
that on entry. The model steady state is characterized by a productivity distribution
that is Pareto in the upper tail and increasing in the lower tail, consistently with
the empirical evidence. We solve the model analytically, and provide a framework to
analyze birth, growth, entry and exit into foreign markets. In the steady state ﬁrms
are created, other ﬁrms are shut down and the surviving ﬁrms experience diﬀerent
growth dynamics and export participation patterns. However, the sales distribution
of exporters in foreign market is Pareto in the upper tail as shown in recent empirical
works. We show the presence of a link between intra-industry ﬁrm heterogeneity, the
width of the band of inaction and persistence in export status.
We solve for the distribution by types of agents deciding to change status in an en-
vironment with uncertainty and adjustment costs. When the underlying uncertainty
26follows a standard Brownian motion the distribution of types overlaps within the
band of inaction. This leads to a complicated system of partial diﬀerential equations
for the transition probability densities. We solve the system using Laplace transform
methods. This method may be extended to other setting in which researchers may
need to retrieve the probability distributions of types. Finally, we simulate the model
using reasonable set of parameters to explore the links between sunk trade costs,
uncertainty, per-period ﬁxed costs and persistence in export status.
27Appendix
Value of the ﬁrm
The value function VD(z) and the cutoﬀ zD are the joint solution of the ordinary
diﬀerential equation (3) subject to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
(4). The general solution of the ordinary diﬀerential equation is the sum of the general
solution of the corresponding homogenous equation (V h
D(z)) and a particular solution
of the non-homogeneous equation (V
p
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α2 +2 ( r + δ)ξ2
ξ2 < 0
are the roots of the associated characteristic equation. The general solution of the
homogeneous equation represents the value of the option to exit.21 Since the likelihood
of abandonment in the not-too-distant future becomes extremely small as z goes to
∞, the value of the abandonment option should go to zero as z becomes very large.




The particular solution of the non-homogeneous equation can be found using the
"undetermined coeﬃcients" method. When the forcing term has the form Ade(σ−1)z+











21This is discussed in the next section of the Appendix.
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The value functions VL(z) and VH(z) can be derived following similar steps.22
Interpretation of VD(z)
The value function VD(z) has two components: V h
D(z), the general solution of the
homogeneous equation, representing the value of the option to exit and V
p
D(z),ap a r -
ticular solution of the non-homogeneous equation, representing the expected present
discounted value of total proﬁts. Ito’s Lemma and the stochastic process for z im-
ply that the stochastic process for domestic variable proﬁts πv
D(z)=R(Pez)
σ−1 (σ −
1)σ−1σ−σ is a geometric BM with drift
£
α(σ − 1) + 1/2ξ2(σ − 1)2¤
πv
D(z) and diﬀusion
coeﬃcient ξ(σ − 1)πv
D(z). Denoting today’s variable proﬁts by πv
D(za), the expected

















22Derivation available upon request.












(r + δ) − α(σ − 1) − 1/2ξ2(σ − 1)2
which represents the value of a ﬁrm without ﬁxed costs λD.S i n c eλD is constant over










so that the other component of the general solution of the ordinary diﬀerential equa-
tion, V h
D(z), represents the value of the option to exit. Notice that V h
D(z) > 0 since
κ2 > 0.
Solving a system of partial diﬀerential equations
We solve the Kolmogorov equation (14) and the system of linked Kolmogorov
equations (15) using Laplace transforms. Letting ˆ h(z)=
R ∞
0 e−χah(a,z)da be the





2ξ2ˆ h00(z) − αˆ h0(z) − χˆ h(z)=−δ(z − ¯ z) z>z D
ˆ h(zD)=0 .
(24)
Let m1(z)=eλ1z and m2(z)=eλ2z, with λ1,2 = α±
q
α2/ξ4 +2 χ/ξ2,b et h es o l u t i o n s
of the homogeneous equation with, without loss of generality, λ1 < 0 and λ2 >
0.L e t m−(.) and m+(.) be two linear combinations of m1(.) and m2(.) such that
limz→∞ m+(z)=0and m−(zD)=0 . The general solution of the nonhomogeneous
equation is
ˆ h(z)=Ψ(z,¯ z)∆(¯ z)dy = Υ(z,¯ z)
















Let m+(z)=eλ1z and m−(z)=eλ1z +Beλ2z. The boundary condition m−(zD)=
0 implies B = −e(λ1−λ2)zD so that m−(z)=eλ1z − eλ1zDeλ2(z−zD).S i n c e m+(.)





































∂z .L e tˆ hX(z)=
R ∞
0 e−χahX(a,z)da






X(z) − αˆ h0
X(z) − χˆ hX(z)=−δ(z − ¯ z)+1
2ξ2ˆ h0
D(zH)δ(z − zH) z>z L
ˆ hX(zL)=0
(26)
















































24Luttmer (2007) shows that (25) is the solution to (14). The Laplace transform of (25) coincides
with our "Laplace transformed" solution. We use Laplace transform to solve (14) because it makes
it much easier to solve the system (15).
31so that
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The inverse Laplace transform of ˆ hX(z) is hX(a,z).
The ﬂux term
Figure (8) plots h(a,z) against z for a particular age a and initial condition ¯ z.
Consider the change in the probability mass in the shaded area when age changes in-
ﬁnitesimally. The area is approximately equal to h(a,z)dz and its change is
∂h(a,z)dz
∂a =




∂z . The probability mass in the
shaded area increases when
∂J(a,z)
∂z < 0 because when the ﬂux is decreasing in z the
mass of particles exiting from the shaded area is bigger than the mass of entering
particles. The right-hand side of the Kolmogorov equation (14) is equal to
∂J(a,z)
∂z .
This clearly shows that J(a,z)=αh(a,z) − 1
2ξ2 ∂h(a,z)
∂z . Now we can consider the









H)δ(s−zH)ds z > zD





hX(a,s)ds = −[JX(a,zH + dz) − JX(a,zH)] + JD(a,z−
H)
which shows that the change, when age increases inﬁnitesimaly, in the mass of export-
ing ﬁrms with productivity slightly higher than zH depends on the mass of exporting
ﬁrms whose productivity becomes slightly higher than zH and on the mass of newly
exporting ﬁrms. A similar intuition is behind the presence of the JX(z+
L,a)δ(z − zL)
term in (15).
Distributions in terms of sales















which can be plugged in (17) to obtain (18),
pu(r)=K2r−θ/(σ−1)
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Figure 1: Sample paths for exporters and non-exporters
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Productivity Distribution, Overall and Exporters









































Figure 3: Stationary Distribution over Productivity and Age
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Figure 5: Determinants of the Band of Inaction


































































Figure 6: Persistence in Export Status and Survivor Functions, Scenarios I and II































Figure 7: Average Time in Export Status, Scenarios I and II
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λX 1 (Scenario I) and .1 (Scenario II)
λH . 1( S c e n a r i oI )a n d5( S c e n a r i oI I )
Table 2: Moments
Moments Moment USA Simulated values
Scenario I Scenario II
Proportion of exporters 21% (BEJK) 7% 14%
Std deviation of log of domestic sales 1.7 (BEJK) 1.2 1.2
Avg total sales entrants/incumbents 25% (DRS) 35% 34%
% of employment accounted for by exporters 40% (AB) 68% 71%
% of exports over GDP 7.5% (AB) 33% 35%
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